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A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT STATE STRUCTURES FOR
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES
Elizabeth F. Brown* and Edward F. Buckley**

ABSTRACT
Within the past thirty-five years approximately fifty nations have
consolidated their financial regulatory agencies into either a single
integrated agency or into two semi-integrated agencies. The United States
has resisted this trend, due in part to a concern that the costs of such
significant consolidation would exceed its benefits. The existing studies
that compare the costs of the consolidated regulators around the world
with the United States regime have often been discounted because they
have been unable to control for differences in culture and regulatory
intensity between those other countries and the United States. This article
attempts to address this problem by examining the costs of six different
regulatory structures used by states within the United States, which range
from separate agencies for each financial services industry to a single
agency that regulates all financial services. As a result, this study
provides a better picture of whether consolidation within the United
States might result in any cost savings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty-five years, at least twenty-three countries, including
the United Kingdom and Germany, have consolidated their financial
service1 regulators to form a single, national financial services regulator
within each of their countries (although some of these countries moved
away from a single regulator model in the wake of the financial crisis).2
Worldwide, roughly fifty countries use either an integrated financial
regulator or two semi-integrated financial regulators to regulate banking,

1. In this article, financial services refer to any of the activities considered financial in nature
pursuant to Section 103 of the GLBA, which include banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance
products and services. GLBA, 12 U.S.C.S. 1843 (2004)). This definition of financial services is not
universally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II Capital Accord excludes insurance
activities from the definition of “financial activities” and excludes insurance entities from the definition
of “financial entities.” BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS –
A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n.6 (June 2004) (hereinafter BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD).
2. Elizabeth F. Brown, Consolidated Financial Regulation: Six National Case Studies and the
Experience of the European Union, The Volcker Alliance (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Background%20Paper%202_Consolidate
d%20Financial%20Regulation%20%20Six%20National%20Case%20Studies%20and%20the%20Experience%20of%20the%20European%
20Union.pdf; Jose de Luna Martinez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated Financial
Sector Supervision 13 (World Bank, Fin. Sector Operations & Pol'y Dep't, Working Paper No. 3096,
2003); James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank
Performance, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS 67 (May 2003); Ellis Ferran, Symposium: Do
Financial Supermarkets Need Super Regulators? Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in
Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003); Marc Quintyn &
Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability (IMF, Working
Paper No. WP/02/46, Mar. 2002); Central Bank of Bahrain, About CBB, Profile,
https://www.cbb.gov.bh/about-cbb/; FINANCIAL SUPERVISION COMMISSION, ANN. REP. 8 (2011)
(Bulgaria); Cayman Island Monetary Authority, About CIMA, What We Do, https://www.cima.ky/aboutus; Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial Regulatory Body, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2003; Finland Financial
Supervisory Authority, About Us, http://www.fin-fsa.fi/en/About_us/Pages/Default.aspx (Finland); FIN.
SERVICES COMMISSION GIBRALTAR, ANN. REP. 3 (2013); Margit Feher, ECB: Hungary Central Bank
Independence, Primary Mandate Must Stay Intact, Wall St. J. Aug. 5, 2013,
http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2013/08/05/ecb-hungary-central-bank-independence-primarymandate-must-stay-intact/ (discussing merger of Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority with the
National Bank of Hungary); Central Bank Reform Act 2010 (Act. No. 23/2010) (Ir.) (made the Central
Bank of Ireland the sole financial regulator); Financial Services Commission Act (Aug. 2, 2001),
https://moj.gov.jm/laws/financial-services-commission-act (created the Jamaican Financial Services
Commission);
National
Bank
of
Kazakhstan,
Financial
Supervision,
http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=805&switch=english; Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, About
SAMA, Functions, http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/AboutSAMA/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx;
Taiwan Combining Financial Regulators to Bring in Investors, TAIWAN NEWS, July 1, 2004.
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insurance, and securities firms.3 Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the
major arguments for the integration of financial regulators were that the
lines between financial products and firms were blurring so that some
insurance products were now fungible with banking products or securities
products and vice versa. Moreover, financial conglomerates that straddle
the banking, insurance, and securities sectors increasingly dominated
financial markets and posed unique regulatory problems that are best dealt
with by consolidated financial regulators, and globalization had eroded
local markets for financial services.4 After the financial crisis of 2008,
concerns about the inability of multiple financial regulators to deal with
systemic risks also led some nations, like France and the United Kingdom,
to reorganize their financial regulators into an integrated or semiintegrated system of financial regulation.5
In the decade before the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. politicians and
academics engaged in a lively debate regarding whether the United States
should consider consolidating some or all of its financial regulators into
either a twin peaks model (one regulator for prudential risks and one

3. Martinez & Rose, supra note 2 at 13; Barth et.al., supra note 2; Central Bank of Bahrain, A
supra note 2; Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission, supra note 2; Cayman Island Monetary
Authority, supra note 2; Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial Regulatory Body, supra note 2; Public
Law 2003-706 of Aug. 1, 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Aug. 2003, p. 13220 (Fr.) (law creating Financial Markets Authority in France); Ordinance No.
2010-76 of Jan. 21, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
Jan. 2010 (Fr.) (law creating the Prudential Supervisory Authority); Finland Financial Supervisory
Authority, supra note 2; FIN. SERVICES COMMISSION GIBRALTAR, supra note 2; Feher, supra note 2;
Central Bank Reform Act 2010, supra note 2; National Bank of Kazakhstan, supra note 2; Taiwan
Combining Financial Regulators to Bring in Investors, supra note 2.
4. Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a
Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. Miami Bus. L. R. 1, 91-92 (Fall/Winter 2005)
5. Int’l Monetary Fund, France: Financial System Stability Assessment 27-28, 35 (IMF Country
Report No. 12/341, Dec. 2012); H.M. GOVERNMENT, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR
GOVERNMENT 9 (2010) [hereinafter U.K. Government 2010 Reform Proposal]; H.M. TREASURY, A NEW
APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 5-7 (June 2011).
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regulator for market conduct risks) or a single agency. 6 However, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20107,
for the most part, avoided this debate.8 While it did consolidate the
functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision into the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, it did not
consolidate any other agencies.9 Instead, it created a new one, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.10
Five years after the financial crisis, several notable former financial
regulators, including former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker,
began to urge U.S. regulators and politicians to reconsider the need for
6. For examples of some of the articles and studies debating the consolidation of U.S. regulators,
see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359, 2360 (June 1998); Helen A. Garten, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
135-138 (2001); Jerry W. Markham, Panel I (Part 2): A Comparative Analysis of Consolidated and
Functional Regulation: Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives
Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 319 (2003)
[hereinafter Markham, Super Regulator]; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL
REGULATION – INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110
(Oct. 2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT]; Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4;
Charles E. Schumer and Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 1, 2006); McKinsey & Co., Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services
Leadership (2007) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT]; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, INTERIM
REPORT (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS];
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY
MARKET (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS]; Richard M. Kovacevich, James Dimon, Thomas A. James, and Thomas A. Renyi, THE
BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS, (The Financial Services Roundtable: Nov. 2007)
[hereinafter THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter PAULSON TREASURY
BLUEPRINT]; Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation
in the United States, (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-19, Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter
JACKSON PHASED CONSOLIDATION PAPER]; Group of 30, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR
FINANCIAL STABILITY (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter GROUP OF 30 REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM -A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION (2009) [hereinafter OBAMA WHITE PAPER ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM];
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY
REFORM (June 2009) [hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS]; Adriane Fresh and Martin Neil Baily, What Does International Experience Tell Us About
Regulatory Consolidation? PEW FINANCIAL REFORM PROJECT, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 6 (2009); Sheila C.
Bair, The Case Against a Super Regulator, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2009) at A29; and BIPARTISAN POLICY
CENTER, DODD-FRANK’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY: A ROAD MAP FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATORY
ARCHITECTURE 8 (Apr. 2014).
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
8. Kevin McCoy, Dodd-Frank act: After 3 years, a long to-do list, Progress of Dodd-Frank Act
Slow
but
Steady,
USA
TODAY,
(Sept.
12,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/03/dodd-frank-financial-reformprogress/2377603/
9. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 7, §§311-313 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§5411-5413).
10. Id. §1011 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §5491).
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consolidating financial services regulators.11 Volcker was motivated by a
desire to make government more efficient and responsive. At the time,
Volcker commented, “I’ve gotten concerned by the seeming impotence
of federal regulatory agencies . . . [t]oo many agencies overlapping, too
many opportunities for delay.”12 In 2014, the Volcker Alliance hired a
project manager to administer its programs aimed at improving financial
regulation.13 One of the issues this project manager explored, was “the
benefits from financial agency consolidation,” which resulted in the
Volcker Alliance report, Reshaping the Financial Regulatory System, that
recommended the United States adopt a U.K.-style twin peaks model at
the federal level.14
The Bipartisan Policy Center issued a report on the same topic in April
2014.15 The report was titled “Dodd-Frank’s Missed Opportunity: A Road
Map for a More Effective Regulatory Architecture.” It recommended that
the existing federal regulators be consolidated into a multi-peaks structure
with a new federal prudential regulator, a new capital markets regulator,
and a new federal insurance regulator.16 It also recommended that the
Federal Reserve serve as both the macro-prudential regulator and as the
financial stability regulator.17
One element of the debate on consolidating the U.S. financial
regulators has involved comparing the costs of the United States'
regulatory regime with those of other nations that have consolidated
regimes.18 These studies, however, fail to account for the significant
cultural and economic differences between the United States and other
nations, which include, among other things, differences in the laws and
regulatory intensity of each nation, differences regarding the role of
government and government regulation in the area of financial services,
and differences in the complexity and sophistication of the financial

Nelson D. Schwartz, Volcker’s Aim: Responsive Government, N.Y. TIMES, (May 29, 2013).
Id.
Volcker Alliance, Position Announcement, Project Manager, (Feb. 11, 2014).
Volcker Alliance, Position Announcement, supra note 13; VOLCKER ALLIANCE, RESHAPING
THE
FINANCIAL
REGULATORY
SYSTEM
6-9
(2015),
https://www.volckeralliance.org/publications/reshaping-financial-regulatory-system.
15. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, supra note 6. Former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker,
Tom Daschle, Bob Dole, and George Mitchell formed the Bipartisan Policy Center in 2007. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 8-9. The prudential regulator would assume the prudential responsibilities of the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve.
The capital markets regulator would merge the functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
17. Id.
18. Among the articles that include such comparisons are the following, Brown, E Pluribus, supra
note 4; Barth et al., supra note 2; Jackson, Howell, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (Summer 2007); Markham,
Super Regulator, supra note 6; and Martinez & Rose, supra note 2.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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markets in each nation. As a result, one cannot argue with any degree of
certainty that the United States would achieve significant cost savings if
it moved toward a semi-integrated or completely integrated financial
regulatory regime.
This article attempts to minimize or eliminate the problems found in
the prior comparisons of national structures by examining the ways that
the states within the United States regulate financial services. State
governments in the United States operate over 100 existing state agencies
that regulate banking, securities, and insurance firms. While the types of
entities and products regulated by the states are similar, how each state
chooses to structure the agencies that regulate financial services vary
considerably. Some states have created a separate agency to regulate
banks, insurance firms, and securities firms, while other states regulate all
financial firms with a single financial services department or agency.19
Examining how the states within the United States regulate financial
services would eliminate or minimize some of the problems that arise
when one compares how different countries regulate financial services.
By minimizing or eliminating many of the significant differences between
national regimes, one can focus in on the question of whether integrated
regulation of financial services is more cost effective and beneficial than
other forms of financial services regulation by looking at the different
regulatory structures used by the states in the United States.
Part II briefly discusses the existing nations that use a semi-integrated
financial regulatory regime or a single financial regulatory regime and the
comparisons that have been done to date between those regimes and the
United States. In addition, this section describes why these comparisons
are of limited value in answering the question of whether the United
States would achieve some cost savings if it were to consolidate its
regulators. Part III outlines the current regulatory regimes for financial
services used among the states within the United States. It also discusses
why the data from how these regimes operate may, or may not, be able to
shed some light on whether integrated regulation of financial services is
preferable from a cost-benefit perspective than the other ways of
19. THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED
BANKING 35 (19th ed., 2003) [hereinafter CSBS Profile]; CAL. DEP'T FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 24-25 (2002);
GA. DEP'T OF BANKING AND FIN., ANN. REP. (2002); HAW. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER
AFFAIRS, ANN. COMPLIANCE RESOL. FUND REP. (2002); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 16 (2002);
IOWA SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, ANN. REP. 27 (2002); MISS. DEP'T OF BANKING & CONSUMER FIN.,
ANN. REP. 12-14 (2002); N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, ANN. REP. 1 (2002); S.C. STATE BD. OF FIN. INST., ANN.
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2002); VT. INS. COMM'R, ANN. REP. 10 (2002); WASH. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN.
REP. 2 (2002); W.VA. BD. OF BANKING AND FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 14, 18, 23 (2002); State of Illinois
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, http://www.idfpr.com (last visited May 8, 2019);
Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services website, https://www.michigan.gov/difs/ (last
visited May 8, 2019). New York Financial Services Law §102 (2014).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/1

6

Brown and Buckley: Structures for Regulating Financial Services

2019]

STRUCTURES FOR REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES

897

regulating financial services.
Part IV develops the testable hypotheses regarding the factors affecting
how much states spend to regulate financial services. To test these
hypotheses, we collected data on how much each state and the District of
Columbia spent to regulate financial services from 1990 to 2006. For
purposes of this article, we are only using the data from 2001 to 2004. We
are only using this sample of the data because the states employed the
widest range of different regulatory structures during this period. One
state, Michigan, even had a single regulator with an internal
organizational structure that replicated the twin peaks structure used in
Australia and the Netherlands. Thus, we can better replicate the diversity
of financial regulatory structures that operate around the globe to see how
the different regulatory structures affect costs.
Part V will then present the empirical results based on the available
data on how costly the various regulatory options are and discuss to what
extent these variations can be attributed to the type of regulatory regime
used rather than other factors. It focuses only on the direct costs to state
governments of employing one regulatory regime rather than other. Part
VI draws some preliminary conclusions based on the results and outlines
future areas for research.
II. FINANCIAL REGULATORS
Table 1 below lists all of the nations in the world that have adopted
either a single financial services regulator or that have consolidated the
regulation of two or more areas of financial services regulation into a
single agency. The first nations to create a single financial services
regulator were Singapore in 1971 and the Scandinavian nations of
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the 1980s and early 1990s.20 The
concept of a single financial services regulatory agency, however, did not
seem to gain significant appeal until the United Kingdom created its
Financial Services Authority (“UK FSA”) in 1997.21 Table 1 also shows
those nations that have adopted a “twin peaks” approach.22

20. Singapore Monetary Authority, About MAS, Overview, http://www.mas.gov.sg/AboutMAS/Overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2014); Martinez & Rose, supra note 2 at 4.
21. GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 28-29 (2008).
22. Michael Taylor, a former officer with the Bank of England, coined the phrase "twin peaks" in
his article, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure For The New Century, which was published by Centre for
the Study of Financial Innovation in 1995. The term "twin peaks" was not used in the final report prepared
by the Australian Financial System Inquiry, which recommended that Australia adopt a system similar to
the one outlined in Taylor's article. Financial System Inquiry, Final Report (Mar. 1997),
http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/publications.asp.
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Table 1: Countries with Either an Integrated or Semi-Integrated
Financial Services Agency as of November 1, 201823
Single
Supervisor for
Financial
Services (Year
Created)
Austria (2002)
Bahrain (2002)
Cayman Islands
(1997)
Denmark (1988)
Estonia (2002)
Germany (20022013)
Gibraltar (1991)
Hungary (2000)
Iceland (2001)
Ireland (2003)
Japan (2000)
Kazakhstan
(2004)
Latvia (2001)
Maldives (1999)
Malta (2002)
Nicaragua
Norway (1986)
Singapore (1984)
South Korea
(1998)
Sweden (1991)
Taiwan (2004)
UAE
UK (1997-2013)

Single Agency Supervising Two Types of
Financial Intermediaries
Banks and
Securities
Firms
Dominican
Republic
Finland
Luxembourg
Mexico
Switzerland
Uruguay

Banks and
Insurers
Belgium
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Peru
Saudi
Arabia
Venezuela

Securities
Firms and
Insurers
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Chile
Egypt
Jamaica
Mauritius
Slovakia
South Africa
Ukraine

Twin Peaks
Model or
Modified
Twin Peaks
Australia
Canada
France
(2013)
Germany
(2013)
Netherlands
UK (2013)

23. Brown, Consolidated Financial Regulation, supra note 2; Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4;
Martinez & Rose, supra note 2, at 13; James R. Barth, Daniel E. Nolle, Triphon Phumiwasana and Glenn
Yago, A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance, 12 FIN.
MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 67 (May 2003); CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY OF IRELAND ACT 2003, No. 12 of 2003 Part IIIA, Ch. I, par. 33B (2003); Central Bank of
Bahrain, Overview, https://www.cbb.gov.bh/about-cbb (Nov. 18, 2018); Bulgaria Financial Supervision
Commission, About FSC, Establishment, http://www.fsc.bg/en/about-fsc/establishment/ (Nov. 18, 2018);
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Even in the nations that use one agency to regulate financial services,
most nations still maintain separate banking, insurance and securities
divisions within that agency. Very few of the nations that had adopted
integrated supervision had been able to harmonize regulations and
supervisory approaches across the financial services industry, although
they did find a greater degree of consistency between the regulation and
supervision of banks and securities firms than banks and insurance
companies.24 Some have speculated that the reasons for this were the
relative newness of the agencies involved—which were generally less
than five years old when the surveys were done—and the lack of
consistency of international standards across the financial services
industry.25
The UK FSA initially moved the furthest towards fully integrated
regulation by regulating based on “objective,” which usually meant
regulating particular risks, such as prudential or market conduct risks,
rather than based on industry sector, such as banking, insurance, or
securities.26 From 1998 to 2000, the UK FSA had a department for
Financial Supervision that handled prudential risks and a department for
Authorization, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection that handled
market conduct risks as shown in Figure 1. In these early years of the UK
FSA’s existence, its internal structure looked similar to the twin peaks
model employed by Australia and the Netherlands.27

Cayman Island Monetary Authority, About Us, https://www.cima.ky/about-us; Dominica to Set Up a
Single Financial Regulatory Body,supra note 2; Finanssivalvonta Financial Supervisory Authority, supra
note 2; Gibraltar Financial Services Commission, About Us, Our Organisation, What We do and Why,
https://www.fsc.gi/fsc/whatwedo (Nov. 1, 2018); Gulmira Kapenova, Supervision of the Securities
Market in Kazakhstan (Apr. 2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/31739306.pdf; SAUDI ARABIA
MONETARY AGENCY, A CASE STUDY ON GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTION BUILDING IN
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN SAUDI ARABIA 12 (Feb. 2004); Financial Supervisory Commission Republic
of China (Taiwan), About FSC, Introduction, https://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=9&parentpath=0,1
(Nov. 18, 2018); and JACKSON PHASED CONSOLIDATION PAPER, supra note 6 at 13. Canada regulates
banking and insurance at the national level using a Twin Peak structure with one agency to manage
prudential risks and another to manage consumer protection issues. In Canada, the regulation of securities
is handled by its ten provinces and three territories, not its federal government.
24. Martinez & Rose, supra note 2 at 31.
25. Id. at 31-32.
26. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2000/01 11-12 (2001).
27. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 21, at 30.
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Figure 1: UK FSA structure from 1998 to 200028

Chairman

Managing Director
& COO

Managing Director
& Head of Financial
Supervision

Managing Director
& Head of
Authorization,
Enforcement, and
Consumer
Protection

In 2001, the UK FSA began to move back towards an internal
organizational structure based on industry segments rather than by
objectives. From 2001 to 2003, the UK FSA had three main
departments—one for Deposit Takers and Markets, which supervised
banks and other depository institutions, one for Consumer, Investment,
and Insurance, which supervised capital markets and insurance, and one
for Regulatory Processes and Risk, as illustrated in Figure 2.29 It also has
a number of cross sector leaders that touch on issues that arise in all three
departments, such as auditing and accounting and asset management.30
The UK FSA, however, did not cover all of the financial services firms
until 2004 when it finally added coverage of mortgage and general
insurance intermediation.31

28. UK FSA ANN. REP. 1997/98, Appendix 2: FSA Organisational Chart, 45 (1998); UK FSA
ANN. REP. 1999/2000, Appendix 2: UK FSA Organisational Chart as of 30 June 2000, 71 (2000).
29. UK FSA, ANN. REP. 2001/02 (2002).
30. Id.
31. UK FSA, ANN. REP. 2004/05 5 (2005).
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Figure 2: UK FSA structure from 2001 to 200332

Chairman

COO

Managing
Director
Deposit Takers
& Markets
Directorate

Managing
Director
Consumer,
Investment &
Insurance
Directorate

Managing
Director
Regulatory
Processes &
Risk
Directorate

In 2004, the UK FSA underwent a major reorganization, which
restructured its departments more along the lines of specific industry
segments as shown in Figure 3. As a result, its internal structure mimicked
in many ways the mixture of institutional and functional regulatory
agencies found in the U.S. regulatory structure and the structures of those
nations that still maintain separate banking, insurance, and securities
divisions within a single agency. It kept this structure until 2009 when it
went through another major reorganization to bring its internal structure
back to something that more approximated the twin peaks approach with
a department for Risk and another for Supervision.33

32. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2000/01, supra note 26, at Appendix 2: Organisational Chart, 72; UK FSA
ANN. REP. 2002/03, Appendix 2: FSA as of 31 March 2003, 122 (June 2003).
33. UK FSA, Ann. Rep. 2009/10 4 (2010).
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Figure 3: UK FSA structure from 2004 to 200934
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The United Kingdom eventually moved to a twin peaks structure on
April 1, 2013 when the U.K. government moved prudential regulation
back to the Bank of England and converted the UK FSA into the Financial
Conduct Authority.35 Even with this structure, some financial services
regulation, such as those pertaining to pensions, are not regulated by the
Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority.36

34. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, Appendix 2: FSA June 2004, 50 (June 2004); UK FSA ANN.
REP. 2005/06, Appendix 2: FSA May 2006, 51 (June 2006); UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, 4 (June 2009).
35. Financial Services Act, 2012, ch. 21 (UK); Press Release, H.M. Treasury and Greg Clark M.P.,
Financial
Services
Bill
Receives
Royal
Assent
(Dec.
19,
2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/financial-services-bill-receives-royal-assent [hereinafter H.M.
Treasury Press Release] (act to take effect on Apr. 1, 2013).
36. Pensions are regulated by the Pension Regulator and by the U.K. Department for Work and
Pensions. Pensions Act 2004, ch. 35, Part 1, §1 (2004) (UK). The Pension Regulator took over the
functions of the Occupational Pensions Review Authority that the Pensions Act 1995 had created to
regulate workplace pensions. Pensions Act 1995, ch. 26, §1 (1995) (UK). In addition, the Pension
Protection Fund (“PPF”) protects defined benefit plan participants in the event that a plan became
insolvent by ensuring that they receive at least a portion of their promised benefits. Pensions Act 2004,
ch. 35, Part 2, §§108-111. Thus, the PPF acts in ways that are similar to the U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. Djuna Thurley, Pensions Protection Fund, H.C. Library S.N. 3917, (July 25, 2012), at 4-5,
30 http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03917.pdf.
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Figure 4: New U.K. financial regulatory structure as of April 1, 201337
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Since its inception until its 2008/09 fiscal year, the UK FSA published
a chart in its annual report comparing its costs with the costs of the
financial services regulatory regimes in the United States, Germany,

37. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, JOURNEY TO THE FCA 11 (2012): Andrew Bailey, The
Prudential Regulatory Authority, BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL., 2012 Q4, at 2.
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France, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Singapore.38 As a result, some studies
have used these figures to make cost comparisons between the United
States and the other nations covered.39
Use of the UK FSA numbers is problematic for several reasons, as the
UK FSA noted. In each of its annual reports, the UK FSA raised the
following caveats regarding the comparability of the data collected: (1)
the figures do not necessarily relate to the same accounting period and
may not have been compiled on the same basis; (2) labor and other costs
vary between countries; (3) variations in exchange rates will affect the
results expressed in a single currency; (4) the scope of the responsibility
of the regulatory authorities differ from one country to the next; and (5)
the nature and scale of the financial services industries in different
countries differs materially.40
In addition to the caveats noted by the UK FSA, several other factors
also make comparisons between the United States and the other nations
problematic. These factors include:
•
•

•

The United Kingdom failed to obtain the regulatory costs for all
of the financial services regulatory agencies, particularly in the
case of the United States.
The significant cultural differences between the United States
and other nations affect the way the financial laws are
implemented and enforced and the way businesses in other
nations interact with financial services providers.
The size of the financial markets that single financial regulators
monitor in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan are
considerably smaller than the U.S. market and all of the effects
of these differences in size cannot be eliminated simply by
looking at costs from the perspective of costs per billion dollars
of gross domestic product (“GDP”).

Comparing the United States with the United Kingdom and Germany
can provide some idea of how significant these differences may be. For
example, the United State federal agencies use a fiscal year that runs from
October 1 to September 30 while most U.S. state financial services
38. UK FSA ANN. REP. 1999/2000, supra note 28, at Appendix 6, 84-85; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2000/01, supra note 26, at Appendix 5, 80-81; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, Appendix 10, 133-38 (2002);
UK FSA ANN. REP. 2002/03, supra note 32, at Appendix 8, 205-10; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, supra
note 34, at Appendix 5, 99-103; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at Appendix 5, 111-14 (June
2005); UK FSA ANN. REP. 2005/06, supra note 34, at Appendix 5, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2006/07,
Appendix 1, 101-04 (2007); UK FSA ANN. REP., 2007/08, Appendix 1, 105-09 (June 2008); UK FSA
ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25.
39. Jackson, supra note 6.
40. For example, see U.K. FSA, ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at 111.
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regulators use a fiscal year that runs from July 1 to June 30.41 The UK
FSA, however, had a fiscal year that ran from April 1 to March 31 while
the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or “BaFin”), which was the single financial
regulator in Germany until 2013, used the calendar year as its fiscal year.42
As a result, the UK FSA and the studies that used those numbers are
comparing data from time periods that are off by at least three to six
months.
More importantly, the UK FSA data only included a portion of the over
115 different state and federal agencies that regulate financial services in
the United States.43 The UK FSA generally included the costs of the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission
(“FDIC”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the National Credit Union
Administration (“NCUA”), and the budgets of the state insurance
agencies provided by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (“NAIC”).44 It failed to include the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FINCEN”), the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (“SIPC”), the Office of the Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (“OFHEO”), which is now the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (“FHFA”), the state banking regulators, the state securities
regulators, the state savings and loan regulators, and the state credit union
regulators. As a result, the UK FSA numbers substantially underestimated
how expensive the U.S. regulatory regime is.
To provide some idea of how much the UK FSA’s numbers
underestimated the total cost of state and federal regulation of financial
services in the United States, the data collected by the UK FSA for
comparison with its 2002/03 fiscal year placed the total annual regulatory

41. U.S.
Senate,
Glossary,
Fiscal
Year,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm; National Conference of State
Legislatures, Quick Fiscal Reference Table, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/basicinformation-about-which-states-have-major-ta.aspx#fyrs (scroll down to “State Fiscal Years”).
42. See UK FSA Ann. Rep. 2008/09, supra note 34, at 2; Int’l Monetary Fund, Germany, 65 Int’l
Financial Statistics 1447 (Apr. 30, 2012).
43. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4, at 6; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as scattered sections of 12,
15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision but created the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which left the total number of federal financial regulators
unchanged); New York Financial Services Law, supra note 19, §102 (2014)(created N.Y. Department of
Financial Services by merging the Department of Banking and the Department of Insurance). The states
had more than 110 financial regulators before the creation of the N.Y. Department of Financial Services
and so even after its creation, the total number of U.S. state and federal financial regulators exceed 115
agencies.
44. For example, see UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix1, 123-25.
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costs incurred by the United States at approximately 12 times the total
annual regulatory costs for the UK FSA. 45 The total regulatory costs for
the United States for 2002 were more than 16 times the annual expenses
of the UK FSA if all of the annual expenses for the Federal Reserve, the
OCC, the OTS, the FDIC, the NCUA, the SEC, the CFTC, the OFHEO,
and the state insurance, banking, and securities agencies were
combined.46
In addition, the UK FSA has not been consistent with regard to which
U.S. agencies it includes. For example, in 2002/03 and 2003/04, the UK
FSA included the budgets for the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) in
the U.S. Department of Treasury and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (“NASD”) but left the budgets for these organizations
out of the charts in later years.47 As a result, the UK FSA numbers
underestimate the regulatory costs of the U.S. system for the fiscal years
of 2002/03 and 2004/05 even more than they did in their other annual
reports.
Nevertheless, the data collected and published by UK FSA provided a
starting point for comparison. For purposes of this article in order to make
the comparisons between the numbers provided in (1) the annual report
for 2003/04 and (2) the annual reports for 2004/05 and 2005/06, the
budgets for the OTS and the NASD were subtracted from the total
regulatory costs listed for the United States for 2003/04. In addition, the
total expenditures for each country and the total GDP for each country
were translated into constant 2000 US dollars to eliminate the effects of
inflation in each country. While the UK FSA provides data for about a
half dozen countries, this article will only use the United Kingdom and
Germany as points of comparison because they were the only two nations
on which the UK FSA collected data that maintained single financial
regulators for the period between 2002 and 2009.

45. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4, at 59-60.
46. Id. at 60-61.
47. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 38, at Appendix 10, 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2002/03, supra note 32, at Appendix 8, 205-10; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, supra note 34, at Appendix
5, 99-103; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, Appendix 5, at 111-14; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2005/06, supra note 34, at Appendix 5, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2006/07, supra note 38, at Appendix
1, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2007/08, supra note 38, at Appendix 1, 105-09; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25.
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Figure 5: Total financial services regulatory expenditures by the
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany
(in millions of constant 2000 US dollars)48

As Figure 5 illustrates, the United States spent at least 12.6 times more
than the United Kingdom and at least 41.2 times more than Germany to
regulate financial services in 2002.49 The United States continued to
spend substantially more than the United Kingdom and Germany for the
rest of the decade. In 2009, the United States spent at least 8.2 times more
than the United Kingdom and at least 29.3 times more than Germany to
regulate financial services.50
Even if one accounts for the differences in the gross domestic product
of each country, the United States still spent substantially more than the
United Kingdom and Germany. In 2002, the United States spent twice as
48. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 38, at Appendix 10, 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2002/03, supra note 32, at Appendix 8, 205-10; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, supra note 34, at Appendix
5, 99-103; UK FSA ANN. EP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at Appendix 5, 111-114; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2005/06, supra note 34, at Appendix 5, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2006/07, supra note 38, at Appendix
1, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2007/08, supra note 38, at Appendix 1, 105-09; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25. Data from UK FSA annual reports converted into U.S.
dollars using the rates set forth in the Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.10 - Historical Exchange
Rates,
Spot
Exchange
Rate,
$US/Pound
Sterling,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_uk.htm (last visited May 7, 2019). The dollars
were then converted into constant 2009 constant dollars using the Inflation Calculator on the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [hereinafter BLS Inflation Calculator].
49. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, at Appendix 10, 133-38; Federal Reserve
Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
50. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical
Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
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much as the United Kingdom and 8.9 times more than Germany to
regulate financial services after accounting for differences in GDP.51
Between 2002 and 2009, the gaps between the United States and the
United Kingdom and between the United States and Germany both
narrowed. In 2009, the United States spent 1.3 times more than the United
Kingdom and 6.2 times more than Germany to regulate financial services
after accounting for differences in GDP.52 The gap between the United
States and the United Kingdom narrowed, in part, because the UK FSA
assumed the responsibility for regulating both mortgage and general
insurance intermediation for the first time in 2004/05 and because the UK
FSA needed to spend more to deal with the 2008 financial crisis.53
Figure 6: Total financial services regulatory expenditures by the
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany
per trillion dollars of GDP (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars)54

51. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, at Appendix 10, 133-38; Federal Reserve
Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD, Stat Extracts, National
Accounts, GDP, US$, current prices, current PPPs, millions (customize data for date range 2002 to 2009),
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE1 (last accessed on May 8, 2019) [hereinafter
OECD GDP].
52. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical
Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD GDP, supra note 51.
53. UK FSA, ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at 5.
54. The data from Figure 5 was divided by the GDP amounts for Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States from the OECD GDP. OECD GDP, supra note 51. These amounts were converted
into constant 2009 dollars using the Inflation Calculator on the Bureau of Labor Statistics. BLS Inflation
Calculator, supra note 48.
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If one looks at the comparison of the expenditures based on the
population of each country in Figure 7, the picture was no better. After
accounting for difference in population, the United States spent 2.6 times
more than the United Kingdom in 2002 and the gap narrowed to 1.6 times
in 2009 as regulatory expenditures increased during the financial crisis.55
The United States spent 11.8 times more than Germany in 2002, which
declined to 7.8.1 times more in 2009.56
Figure 7: Total financial services regulatory expenditures by the
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany
per million people (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars)57

One cannot tell from looking at these comparisons how much more
expensive the United States is because of its highly fragmented regulatory
structure. Howell Jackson attempted to address this problem by analyzing
the budgets and staffing levels of each country. 58 He also analyzed the
securities enforcement actions brought by each country in order to begin
55. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, at Appendix 10, 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 23; BLS
Inflation
Calculator,
supra
note
48;
OECD,
Stat
Extracts,
Population,
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=POP_FIVE_HIST [hereinafter OECD Population]
56. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 38, Appendix 10, at 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2008/09, supra note 34, Appendix 1, at 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS
Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD Population, supra note 55.
57. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, Appendix 10, at 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP.
2008/09, supra note 34, Appendix 1, at 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS
Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD Population, supra note 55.
58. Jackson, supra note 18, at 269-77.
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to determine the regulatory intensity of each nation.59 His analysis,
however, was preliminary as he did not have comprehensive data for the
United States. For example, he did not have data regarding U.S. state
securities regulators’ budgets. He also lacked the budgets for some
agencies for certain years, and so he extrapolated the data from prior
years.60
Jackson’s preliminary conclusions—based on analyses of budgets and
staffing levels—were that the United States regulates banking far more
intensely than any other country and is near the top end of the spectrum
with regard to insurance regulation.61 He also noted that the United States
regulates securities significantly less intensely than Australia and
Canada.62 This comparison, however, may be flawed as the budget for the
United States does not include the costs of U.S. state securities regulators.
Jackson did note that if one looks at enforcement actions, the United
States regulated securities more intensely than either the United Kingdom
or Germany.63
While recognizing that Jackson’s analysis and conclusions were
preliminary, it is worth noting that he did not attempt to tease out whether
the differences in regulatory intensity are due to differences in the scope
of the laws that regulatory authorities implement or due to cultural
differences regarding enforcement. For example, a larger percentage of
the population in the United States and in the United Kingdom own stocks
than in Germany. This fact was true both before and after the financial
crisis. In the United States in 2002, 84.3 million individuals, or 29.2
percent of the total U.S. population, and 52.7 million U.S. households, or
47.3 percent of all U.S. households, owned equities, either through
individual stocks or through stock mutual funds.64 In the United
Kingdom, 23.3 percent of the population owned stocks directly in 1996.65
In Germany, only 9.8 percent of the population owned any stocks directly
in 2000.66 More recent data indicates that these percentages have
declined. In the first half of 2010, only 6 percent of Germans directly

59. Id. at 278-86.
60. Id. at 266, note 16.
61. Id. at 270.
62. Id. at 269.
63. Id. at 278-86.
64. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004 7 & 33 (Aug. 26, 2004)
(Estimated U.S. population in 2002 was 288.2 million and estimated the number of householders at 111.3
million) https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2004/compendia/statab/124ed/tables/pop.pdf?#
(last visited May 8, 2019); Investment Company Institute and Securities Industry Association, Equity
Ownership in America, 2002, 1 (2002), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_02_equity_owners.pdf
65. Laurence Boone and Natalie Girourard, The Stock Market, the Housing Market and Consumer
Behavior, OECD ECON. STUDIES NO. 35, 175 (June 22, 2002).
66. Id.
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owned stocks while 10 percent of Britons did.67 The differences continue
to exist when one takes into indirect ownership of stocks through mutual
funds or similar investments. In 2009, 44 percent of U.S. households
owned mutual funds while only 9.4 percent of German households owned
stock investments.68 Both the United States and the United Kingdom
regulate their securities markets more intensively than Germany does due
to the perceived need to protect the larger number of less sophisticated
investors active in the securities and futures markets in the U.S. and the
U.K. than in Germany.
Unless one can eliminate or significantly reduce certain factors, like
differences in regulatory intensity or cultural attitudes towards
government regulation, it is difficult to conclude with any certainty that
if the United States moved to a single financial services regulatory model,
it would create a more efficient regulatory regime and achieve substantial
cost savings. As a result, continuing to make adjustments when
comparing one nation with another might not be the best way to address
the question: will consolidating regulators into a single regulator create a
more efficient regulatory regime?
III. STATE REGULATORY STRUCTURES FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
One way of eliminating or reducing many of the factors that arise when
making nation-to-nation comparisons is to examine whether consolidated
regulators within the 50 states and the District of Columbia are more
efficient than multiple regulators. The states use a range of regulatory
structures that run the gamut from having a separate agency to regulate
each industry sector to having a single regulator that regulates based on
risk, like the UK FSA. The data from the states avoids the complications
created by converting budgets in one currency into another currency for
comparison. In addition, all but four states use the same fiscal year, July
1 to June 30, for their budgets.69 As a result, the data being compared
comes from the same time periods for the most part. The movements to
encourage states to adopt uniform laws mean that banking, securities, and
insurance laws do not vary among the states to the same degree that the
laws governing financial services vary among nations. In addition, the
extent to which the populations of the different states use different types
of financial instruments does not vary as substantially as the extent to

67. Julie Cruz, Why Don't Germans Invest in Stocks?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 30, 2010),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-30/why-dont-germans-invest-in-stocksbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
68. Id.
69. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 41. The four states who use a different
fiscal year are Alabama, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Id.
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which the populations in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Germany use different financial instruments. As a result, comparing how
states regulate financial services may provide a better way of determining
whether, from a cost perspective, the United States would benefit if it
created a single financial services regulator.
A. Regulatory Options
The 50 states and the District of Columbia employ or have employed
financial regulatory structures that may be classified into six different
options:
•
•
•
•
•

•

Option 1: separate agencies to regulate banking, securities, and
insurance.70
Option 2: a semi-integrated agency that regulates both banks and
securities firms while a separate agency regulates insurance
companies.
Option 3: a semi-integrated agency that regulates both banks and
insurance companies while a separate agency regulates
securities firms.
Option 4: a semi-integrated agency that regulates both insurance
companies and securities firms while a separate agency
regulates banks.
Option 5: a single agency that regulates all financial firms, but
which maintains separate departments for banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms, which is similar to how most
single financial regulators are structure, including the UK FSA
from 2004 to 2009.
Option 6: a single agency that regulates all financial services and
organizes its departments based on regulatory objectives, such
as prudential concerns and market conduct objectives, which is
similar to the UK FSA’s structure from 1998 to 2003 and 2009
to the present. This one is the closest to the twin peaks model
used by Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands.

Table 2 below lists which states fit within each of these categories.

70. In some states, the banking regulators also regulate savings and loans and credit unions while
in other states, such as Texas, the banking regulators only regulate banks and a separate regulator exists
to regulate savings and loans and credit unions.
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Table 2: States with Either an Integrated or Semi-Integrated Financial
Services Agency from 2002 to 201871
Option

Option 2:

Option 3:

Option 4:

Option 5:

Option 6:

Separate

1:

Banks and

Banks and

Securities

Single

Single

Agency

Securities

Insurers

Firms and

Agency

Supervisor

For Banking,

Firms

Insurers

containing

for

Securities, &

Divisions for

Financial

Insurance

Banking,

Services

Firms

Securities, &
Insurance

Alabama

Connecticut

Illinois (2004 -

Tennessee

Alaska

Michigan

Arizona

Idaho

present)

Montana

Colorado

(2000

Arkansas

Kentucky

New Jersey

District of

2008)

California

Louisiana

New York

Columbia

Delaware

Nebraska

(2011–present)

(2004-

Georgia

New Mexico

Nevada

present)

Indiana

Ohio

Florida

Kansas

Washington

(2002)

Maryland

Wisconsin

Hawaii

Massachusetts

Iowa

Mississippi

Maine

Missouri

Michigan

New

(2009-

Hampshire

present)

New

Minnesota

York

(until 2011)

Oregon

North

Rhode Island

Carolina

South Dakota

North Dakota

Vermont

Oklahoma

Virginia

-

Pennsylvania
South
Carolina
Texas
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming

71. Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, State Agency Quick Access, (Nov. 18, 2018)
https://www.csbs.org/state-bank-agency-contact-quick-access; California Department of Business
Oversight, About Us, (Nov. 18, 2018) http://www.dbo.ca.gov/About_DBO/default.asp; GA DEP’T. OF
BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP. (2017); Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs,
Financial Institutions, Regulation, (Nov. 18, 2018) http://cca.hawaii.gov/dfi/regulation/; IND. DEP’T. OF.
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While many of the states with semi-integrated or integrated financial
regulators only created these agencies within the last fifteen years, others
have had such arrangements for decades. Virginia’s Bureau of Financial
Institutions has been in existence since 1910.72 Other states only
consolidated their banking and securities following the adoption of the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”) and
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”),
which preempted significant parts of state securities laws in order to
eliminate duplication of federal regulations at the state level by, among
other things, eliminating state registration and merit review of federal
covered securities. As a result, all states now are limited to registering
non-federal covered securities and are forced to concentrate on the
registration of, and taking antifraud enforcement against, certain types of
securities professionals. Still, other states, like Michigan, were prompted
to consolidate their financial services into semi-integrated or integrated
agencies following the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act by
Congress in 1999, which attempted to shift financial services regulation
towards a functional regulatory approach, rather than an institutional
regulatory approach.73
Michigan attempted to move beyond institutional and functional
regulatory models and towards a risk regulatory model in 2000. Michigan
reorganized its financial regulatory structure to focus on regulatory goals
concerning risks (prudential risks, market conduct risks, etc.) rather than
on financial sectors.74 Michigan’s Office of Financial and Insurance
FIN. INST. ANN. REP. 13 (2017); Iowa Division of Banking, Who We Regulate, (Nov. 18, 2018)
https://www.idob.state.ia.us/; MICH. DEP’T. OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES, FIN. INST. BUREAU,
1999 ANN. REP. 55 (2000); MICH. INS. BUREAU, 1999 ANN. REP. 25 (2000); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS.
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2003 ANN. REP. 11 (2004); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS.
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2006 ANN. REP. 6 (2006); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS.
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2007 ANN. REP. 4 (2007); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS.
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2008 ANN. REP. 5 (2008); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS.
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2009 ANN. REP. 5 (2009); Mich. Executive Order No.
2013-1 (Jan. 16, 2013) (creating the Michigan Dept. of Insurance and Financial Services); MISS. DEP’T.
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. REP., 6 (2017); 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ORG. & MAINT. REP., 1
(2002); New York Financial Services Law §102 (2014)(created N.Y. Department of Financial Services in
2011 by merging the Department of Banking and the Department of Insurance); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST.
ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2016); Vermont Department of Financial Regulation,
http://www.dfr.vermont.gov/ (Nov. 18, 2018); WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP. 2014-2015, 4 (2015);
W.VA. 116TH ANN. REP. FIN. INST., 1-2 (2017); State of Illinois Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation website, supra note 19; North American Securities Administrators Association, Contact Your
Regulator http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/contact-us/contact-your-regulator/ (Nov. 18, 2018); and Nat’l
Assoc.
Ins.
Com.,
Membership
List
(revised
Aug.
8,
2018),
http://www.naic.org/documents/members_membershiplist.pdf.
72. BUREAU OF FIN. INST., STATE CORP. COM., COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, SUMMARY OF
OPERATIONS 5 (2013).
73. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4, at 23.
74. Id.
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Services (“OFIS”) claimed to be “the first state to coordinate regulation
of financial institutions, insurance, and securities industries under the
federal Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.”75 Michigan
created the OFIS in April 2000 by combining the Financial Institutions
Bureau, the Insurance Bureau, and the Securities Bureau.76 Frank
Fitzgerald, who was the commissioner of the Michigan Insurance Bureau
at the time that the OFIS was created and became the first commissioner
to lead the OFIS, justified the creation of the new office by stating: "The
old fire walls are breaking down and the operative word today is
convergence . . . The new office is intended to improve regulatory
efficiency.”77
Initially, the OFIS had three divisions that essentially replicated the
three former bureaus, which meant that it would have been classified as
Option Five among the regulatory structures discussed above.78 From
2002 to 2008, however, the OFIS reorganized its internal structure so that
it was divided into two offices that regulate based on risk: (1) the Office
of Financial Evaluation, which deals with prudential regulation and
supervision, and (2) the Office of Policy, Conduct, and Consumer
Assistance, which deals with market conduct risks. 79 As a result, it
operated like the UK FSA did in its early years and, in many ways, similar
to the twin peaks model used by Australia. Its regulatory structure was the
only one classified as an Option Six for the period of this study.
In 2008, Michigan abandoned its innovated structure.80 It reverted to
an internal structure organized along institutional lines with separate
divisions for specific sectors like banks and trusts, credit unions, and
insurance companies. In addition, it renamed the OFIS to the Office of
Financial and Insurance Regulation (“OFIR”).81 In January 2013,
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed an executive order to remove
OFIR from the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs and make
it the new Department of Insurance and Financial Services.82 It retained
its internal institutional organizational structure.

75. Id.
76. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2000 ANN. REP.
(2000) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2000 ANN. REP.].
77. State to Oversee Financial Firms: Engler Plans to Set Up Regulatory Office to Keep Tabs On
Banks, Insurers, Brokers, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 28, 2000) at 1B.
78. MI OFIS 2000 ANN. REP., supra note 76.
79. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2003 ANN. REP.
7-8(2003) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2003 ANN. REP.].
80. Press Release, Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, OFIS Renamed
Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation (April 8, 2008).
81. Id.
82. Press Release, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, Snyder signs executive order establishing
Department of Insurance and Financial Services (Jan. 17, 2013).
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B. Why Examine State Regulatory Structures?
1. Benefits of Comparing State Regulatory Structures
Comparisons regarding how different nations regulate financial
services face several problems that are minimized or eliminated when
comparing how states within the United States regulate financial services.
These problems include:
•
•
•
•
•

Differences in composition and sophistication of the financial
services industry;
Differences in regulatory objectives;
Differences in resource endowments, like wages, capital costs
and education;
Differences in enforcement intensity; and
Differences in the degree to which the population respects the
law.

The range of these differences between states in the United States is very
small or nonexistent.
Financial conglomerates hold substantial market shares of the financial
services industry throughout the United States.83 As a result, highly
sophisticated financial services may be obtained in any state. The range
of products and services that financial firms can offer may vary,
particularly in the area of insurance, from state to state, but generally,
most products and services are available throughout the United States.
Many of the states have adopted similar laws for regulating financial
products and firms. In the area of securities, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) began drafting a
uniform law to regulate the sale of securities in 1922 and proposed the
Uniform Sale of Securities Act of 1930.84 The second uniform securities
act proposed by NCCUSL, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, was
ultimately adopted by 37 states.85 In 1985, NCCUSL proposed the first
major revision to the 1956 act and additional amendments were
distributed in 1988.86 In 2002, NCCUSL promulgated a fourth version of
the Uniform Securities Act.87 Only a handful of states adopted the 1985
or the 2002 versions of the Uniform Securities Act.88
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4 at 4-5.
Uniform Securities Act (1930).
Uniform Securities Act (1956).
Uniform Securities Act (1985) with amendments.
Uniform Securities Act (2002).
Uniform Securities Act (1985) with amendments and Uniform Securities Act (2002).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/1

26

Brown and Buckley: Structures for Regulating Financial Services

2019]

STRUCTURES FOR REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES

917

State laws in the area of securities have also been shaped by the federal
securities regulations. The scope of state regulatory authority has been
significantly curtailed by federal securities laws, like NSMIA and
SLUSA, which have preempted states’ ability to regulate certain aspects
of the securities industry. State securities regulators also regulate brokerdealers and brokerage firms who sell securities within their states as well
as investment advisers who manage less than $25 million. Unlike bank
regulators, state securities regulators traditionally were not primarily
focused on prudential concerns addressing the stability of the financial
system and the solvency of the firms operating within it but were more
focused on protecting investors from fraud by requiring disclosure of all
material information.89
State banks are chartered by individual states and can choose to either
be a member of the Federal Reserve System or not.90 A state-chartered
bank will be supervised and regulated by the banking commission or
similar agency of the state that issued its charter.91 If the state-chartered
bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System, then it will be subject
to the regulation and supervision of the Federal Reserve. 92 If the statechartered bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve System, then the
FDIC will be its primary federal regulator.93 The FDIC also acts as a backup supervisor for other national chartered and state-chartered banks,
which are insured by the FDIC.94
In the years following the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”), the total number of banks in the United States, both nationally
chartered and state-chartered, has declined.95 In 2003, state-chartered
banks comprised at least 75 percent of the total number of banks in the
United States, but held only 44.6 percent of the total deposits in the United
States.96 In addition to holding fewer deposits than nationally chartered
banks, state-chartered banks on average were less profitable than national
banks in 2003.97
89. PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL 2D, §12.02[2] (2003).
90. Id. at §§2.03[a], 3.02.
91. Id.
92. 12 U.S.C.S. §§248, 325, 338, 483 (2014).
93. 12 U.S.C.S. §1831a (2014).
94. 12 U.S.C.S. §§1815 and 1828 (2014).
95. FDIC,
Statistics
on
Depository
Institutions
(May
28,
2004),
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp. The total number of nationally chartered banks declined 15.5 percent
to 1999 banks in 2003, while the number of state-chartered banks declined 7.1 percent to 5,771 banks in
2003. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In 2003, the return on equity for national banks was 16.1 percent, up slightly from 1999
when the return on equity for national banks was 15.1 percent. Id. The return on equity for state banks
was 13.0 percent in 2003, down 9.7 percent from the 14.4 percent return on equity that state banks had in
1999. Id.
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State-chartered thrifts are also chartered, supervised, and regulated by
the state savings and loan commissions that granted them their charters.
The FDIC acts as a back-up regulator for thrifts that are insured by
Savings Association Insurance Fund (“SAIF”) of the FDIC and examines,
supervises, and regulates state-chartered savings associations that are
insured by SAIF.98 In 2003, state-chartered savings and loans comprised
only 12.2 percent of all of the savings associations in the United States.99
A dual regulatory system also exists for credit unions. Credit unions
may be chartered and regulated either by state authorities or by the
National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).100 The NCUA also
contains the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (“NCUSIF”),
which insures deposits within credit unions.101
Credit unions cannot serve the general public but can only serve their
members who generally must share a single common bond based on an
occupation or community if the credit union has more than 3,000
members or may share multiple common bonds if the credit union has less
than 3,000 members.102
The dual regulatory structures in the areas governing depositary
institutions has resulted in state laws, which have been heavily influenced
by federal banking laws in order to maintain the competitiveness of the
state charters as alternatives to a national charter. As a result, state
banking laws contain many common features. For example, during the
period from 2001 to 2004, which is the period that we are using to
compare the states’ budgets, a majority of states had laws that authorized
state-chartered banks or their subsidiaries to engage in the following
activities among others:
•
•
•
•
•

May sell insurance within state (50 states).103
May establish or own operating subsidiaries (49 states).104
May sell annuities (48 states).105
May operate a discount securities brokerage (48 states).106
May have competitive equality with national banks (47
states).107

98. 12 U.S.C.S. §1463 (2014).
99. Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 2003 Fact Book 2 (2004). The United
States had 928 savings associations in 2003, of which 815 had national charters. Id.
100. 12 U.S.C.S. §1752(a) (2014).
101. 12 U.S.C.S. §1782 (2014).
102. 12 U.S.C.S. §1759 (2014).
103. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 276-81.
104. Id. at 304-10.
105. Id. at 276-81.
106. Id. at 290-95.
107. Id. at 311-19.
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May operate a full securities brokerage (45 states).108
May sell crop insurance (40 states).109
May engage in municipal general obligation bond underwriting
(39 states).110
May sell title insurance (38 states).111

States are the primary regulators of financial services only in the
insurance area. Unlike depository institutions, which are regulated by
both the federal and state governments, insurance is regulated almost
exclusively by the states. The state insurance commissions or
corresponding agency regulate insurance products and insurance
companies.112 All state insurance commissions also license insurance
producers, although the exact type of licenses issued varies.113 Some
states issue a general insurance producer license while others issue
licenses for each different type of producer, such as individual licenses
for agents, brokers, solicitors, consultants, and reinsurance
intermediaries.114 In 2002, there were 7,173 domestic insurers and 3.8
million licensed insurance producers in the United States.115 In 2017,
there were only 5,954 domestic insurers in the United States.116 The
decline in the number of insurers was primarily due to mergers. The
number of licensed insurance producers had climbed to over 9 million by
2017.117
As previously noted, 46 of the 50 states operate on the same fiscal year,
July 1 to June 30. As a result, the data obtained regarding their budgets
are more reliably comparable than the data regarding the budgets of the
United States and the United Kingdom or Germany.
All of these similarities among state financial laws reduce the
likelihood that substantial differences in the cost of regulatory regimes
among states derives from differences in regulatory intensity.

108. Id. at 290-95.
109. Id. at 276-88.
110. Id. at 287-89.
111. Id. at 299-303.
112. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2002 Insurance Department Resources
Report (2003) [hereinafter NAIC 2002 REPORT].
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 39 and 53.
116. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2017 Insurance Department Resources
Report 35 (2018) [hereinafter NAIC 2018 REPORT].
117. Id. at 51.
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2. Problems of Comparing State Regulatory Structures
Nevertheless, significant differences still exist when one compares the
states with one another. First, not all states are transparent about how
much they spend to regulate financial services. While data on how much
a state spends to regulate banking and insurance usually can be obtained
easily from the Conference for State Banking Commissioners and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, data on how much a
state spends to regulate securities cannot be easily obtained from the
North American Securities Administrators’ Association (“NASAA”)
because NASAA does not make it publicly available. In addition, states’
spending on securities regulation is difficult to obtain directly from the
states because, in many cases, the securities regulators are embedded in
larger departments or offices, which do not publish how much of their
budget goes to securities regulation. For example, in the period from 2001
to 2004 covered by our data set, New York regulated securities through
its Office of the Secretary of State and through its Office of the Attorney
General. Unfortunately, the publicly available budgets for those offices
do not disclose how much they spent to regulate securities.
The size of state GDP from financial services industry can vary
significantly among the states and, in some cases, are substantially more
than the differences in the size of the total U.S. GDP from financial
services when compared to other major developed nations, such as
Germany and the United Kingdom.118 For example, in 2002, New York’s
GDP from financial services was $126 billion (in constant 2000 U.S.
dollars), which was over 192 times as large as Wyoming’s GDP from
financial services.119 This example is the most extreme case as New York
has the largest financial services industry and Wyoming has the smallest.
The average state GDP from financial services was $16.3 billion in 2002.
The disparities in the size of the U.S. financial services industry in each
state peaked just prior to the start of financial crisis. In 2006, New York's
GDP from financial services was $155.2 billion (in constant 2000 U.S.
dollars), which was 258 times as large as Wyoming's GDP from financial
services.120 By 2009, this had narrowed substantially. New York's GDP
118. Bureau
of
Economic
Analysis,
Gross
Domestic
Product
by
State,
https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state (May 7, 2019) ["BEA State GDP"]. Reportedly, six percent of
Germany's GDP came from financial services in 2009 while eight percent of the United Kingdom's GDP
came from financial services. UK 'blocking tough financial rules', BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8270404.stm.
119. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data
converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
120. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and
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from financial services in 2009 was down to $136.8 billion (in constant
2000 U.S. dollars), which was only 184 times as large as Wyoming's GDP
from financial services.121
In addition, the relative importance of the financial services industry to
the overall economy of each state varies significantly. In 2002, the top
five states with the largest percentage of their GDP derived from financial
services were:
1. Delaware (Option 1) – 35.2% of total GDP from financial services
2. South Dakota (Option 5) – 19.1% of total GDP from financial
services
3. New York (Option 1) – 16.0% of total GDP from financial services
4. Connecticut (Option 2) – 15.3% of total GDP from financial
services
5. Rhode Island (Option 5) – 13.3% of total GDP from financial
services122
In 2004, Rhode Island slipped from the top five and was replaced by
Iowa, which remained in the top five through 2009. In 2009, the top five
states with the largest percentage of their GDP derived from financial
services were:
1. Delaware (Option 1) – 36.4% of total GDP from financial services
2. South Dakota (Option 5) – 19.1% of total GDP from financial
services
3. Connecticut (Option 2) – 18.4% of total GDP from financial
services
4. Iowa (Option 5) – 16.2% of total GDP from financial services
5. New York (Option 1) – 15.7% of total GDP from financial
services123
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data
converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
121. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data
converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
122. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data
on state total GDPs derived by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)"
under Step 2, "All States and Regions" under Step 3, "All industry total" under Step 4, and years 2002 to
2009 under Step 5. Data converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator,
supra note 48. Then the amount of state GDPs' derived from financial services was divided by the amount
of state total GDPs to obtain the percentages listed.
123. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data
on state total GDPs derived by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)"
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Some people may be surprised that Delaware and South Dakota derive
a larger percentage of their GDP from financial services than New York,
particularly since these two states are among the bottom 10 states in terms
of population. In fact, Delaware and South Dakota have taken advantage
of a unique feature of federal banking law that affects credit cards. Under
federal banking law, a national bank may charge its customers up to the
interest rate permitted by the state in which the bank actually processes
the credit card transaction.124 National banks are not bound by the interest
rate limits of the state in which the customer is located, or the interest rate
limits of the state in which the purchase of goods or services occurred.125
Neither Delaware nor South Dakota imposes any limit on the interest rates
charged by financial institutions. As a result, both states have successfully
attracted a large number of national banks that would like to charge high
interest rates to their credit card customers.
In 2002, the five states with the lowest percentage of their GDPs
derived from financial services were:
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Idaho (Option 2) – 4.2% of GDP from financial services
Louisiana (Option 2) – 4.0% of GDP from financial services
New Mexico (Option 2) – 3.7% of GDP from financial services
Alaska (Option 5) – 3.3% of total GDP from financial services
Wyoming (Option 1) – 3.2% of total GDP from financial
services126

During the first decade of the 21st century, the percentage of Idaho's
GDP derived from financial services grew to 5.3% by 2009, which
allowed it to escape the bottom five.127 In 2009, the five states with the
lowest percentage of their GDPs derived from financial services were:

under Step 2, "All States and Regions" under Step 3, "All industry total" under Step 4, and years 2002 to
2009 under Step 5. Data converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator,
supra note 48. Then the amount of state GDPs' derived from financial services was divided by the amount
of state total GDPs to obtain the percentages listed.
124. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its
Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 522, 544 (2004).
125. Id.
126. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data
on state total GDPs derived by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)"
under Step 2, "All States and Regions" under Step 3, "All industry total" under Step 4, and years 2002 to
2009 under Step 5. Data converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator,
supra note 48. Then the amount of state GDPs' derived from financial services was divided by the amount
of state total GDPs to obtain the percentages listed.
127. Id.
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Hawaii (Option 5) – 4.3% of GDP from financial services
New Mexico (Option 2) – 4.07% of GDP from financial services
Louisiana (Option 2) – 3.9% of GDP from financial services
Alaska (Option 5) – 3.7% of total GDP from financial services
Wyoming (Option 1) – 2.5% of total GDP from financial
services128

Given the importance that oil and agriculture play in the economies of
these states, and the relatively small populations of Alaska, Hawaii,
Idaho, and New Mexico compared to the rest of the states, it is perhaps
not surprising that financial services do not play a significant role in their
economies.
States also show a wide variation in how much of their overall state
budgets goes to regulate financial services. In no state does financial
services regulation make up more than 1% of the state budget and the
states with the largest GDPs from financial services do not spend a larger
percentage of their state budgets to regulate financial services. In 2002,
the top five states that spend the largest percentage of the total state budget
to regulate financial services were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Vermont (Option 5) – 0.90%
New Hampshire (Option 1) – 0.66%
North Dakota (Option 1) – 0.57%
Arkansas (Option 1) – 0.53%
Nebraska (Option 2) – 0.48%129

In that same year, the bottom five states that spent the smallest
percentage of the total state budget to regulate financial services were:
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Massachusetts (Option 1) – 0.09%
Minnesota (Option 5) – 0.11%
Indiana (Option 1) – 0.12%
New Mexico (Option 2) – 0.14%
Wisconsin (Option 2) – 0.15%130

In almost all cases, the budgets for the state financial services regulators
are derived from the fees collected by the agencies from the financial
services firms that they regulate.
Finally, state governments have a range of attitudes regarding the need
for government regulation of business in general. These attitudes may
128. Id.
129. See infra Appendix A.
130. See infra Appendix A.
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affect how much states are willing to spend to regulate financial services,
which in turn may affect the level of consumer protection available in
different states. How to accurately capture these differences in attitudes
is problematic as different rankings of states regarding how much they
regulate business in general sometimes produce vastly different results.
For example, both Forbes magazine and the Small Business &
Entrepreneurship Council (SBEC) rank the 50 states based on their
regulatory and tax environments for businesses.131 In 2010, SBEC ranked
South Dakota, Nevada, Texas, Wyoming, and Washington as having the
five best business climates for small businesses, which they define as
having the lowest level of regulation and business taxes, while it ranked
New Jersey, New York, California, Vermont, and Maine as having the
worst business climates.132 Forbes, on the other hand, rated Utah,
Virginia, North Carolina, Colorado, and Washington as having the five
best regulatory environments for business and Maine, Rhode Island,
Mississippi, Michigan, and Hawaii as having the worst.133
As the above problems illustrate, a comparison of state regulatory
structures may eliminate or minimize some of the problems inherent when
making comparisons among nations. However, it still leaves other
differences that need to be controlled for if one is going to ascertain
whether an integrated regulatory structure is preferable to the current
multiple agency structure.
IV. HYPOTHESES
In this section we develop a series of hypotheses to test whether a
regulatory regime that relies on separate regulators for each major
financial service (Option 1) is more expensive or less expensive than the
consolidated regimes (Options 2 to 6). Prior to conducting our
regressions, we expected to find that consolidated regulation would be
less expensive than a regime that used multiple regulatory agencies. One
can imagine a number of reasons why a single financial regulator might
be more cost effective than multiple regulators. The multiple regulator
approach embodied in Option 1 (multiple regulators) potentially entails
the following costs, which could be minimized or eliminated by
consolidating some or all of the regulatory agencies:
131. Badenhausen, Kurt, Best Places - Table: The Best States for Business and Careers, Forbes
(Oct. 13, 2010) http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/13/best-states-for-business-business-beltway-beststates-table.html; SBEC, Small Business Survival Index 2010 Ranks State Policy Climates for
Entrepreneurship,
Business
News
Press
Release
(Dec.
9,
2010)
http://www.sbecouncil.org/news/display.cfm?ID=4099 ["SBEC, 2010 Rankings"]. SBEC has been
conducting an annual ranking of the states for the past fifteen years. SBEC, 2010 Rankings.
132. SBEC, 2010 Rankings, supra note 131.
133. Badenhausen, supra note 131.
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Multiple regulators may fail to communicate and cooperate
with one another effectively.
Multiple regulators may issue inconsistent or duplicative
regulations.
Multiple regulators may create confusion for consumers who
may find it difficult to ascertain which agency is responsible for
the relevant financial firm, product, or service.
Multiple regulators may fail to adequate address the range of
conflict of interest problems posed by financial
conglomerates.
Multiple regulators that specialize in a particular financial
segment may be more prone to agency capture than more
diversified single regulators.

For example, a single state agency may eliminate regulatory overlap and
duplication as well as the inter-agency turf wars, in which the agencies
frequently engage.
One might have expected to see lower costs with a single agency
because economies of scale would allow the single agency to perform the
same functions with fewer people than are currently employed by all of
the state agencies combined. The single agency could also reassign
agency officials to where the needs are the greatest more easily than the
individual smaller agencies can. Internal services that are common to all
of the state agencies, such as human resources, purchasing, and
accounting, could also achieve cost savings by achieving economies of
scale and reducing duplication of efforts.134
To varying degrees, some U.S. states have benefited from these types
of economies of scale cost savings. The State of Illinois was able to save
14% in 2004 over the amount it spent in 2003 to regulate financial
services by consolidating some of its separate financial regulators to form
the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation in 2004.135
While Michigan’s regulatory expenses increased initially in 2001 and
2002 after creating its single financial services regulatory agency, they
decreased substantially in 2003.136 In 2003, Michigan spent 14% less than
134. California Performance Review Commission, A Government for the People for a Change
(Aug. 3, 2004), https://immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/CAGOV_US/C040803H.pdf
(last accessed May 7, 2019). The report cited the consolidation of internal services to achieve economies
of scale as a major benefit of its proposal to dramatically consolidate the number of California
departments, agencies and boards. Id. at 96.
135. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, PRESS RELEASE,
Five Agency Merger Will Net $14 million in Savings (Feb. 18, 2004).
136. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2001 ANN. REP.
10 (2001) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2001 ANN. REP.]. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR
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it spent in 1999 to regulate financial services.137
Nevertheless, in constructing our tests, we choose to employ the use of
a categorical variable for the different regulatory options. The base case
is Option 1, in which multiple agencies are used to regulate financial
services. A negative (positive) coefficient will indicate that the option is
cheaper (more expensive) than the base case.
The first two hypotheses examine the costs of the consolidated
regulatory options relative to the costs of Option 1 (multiple regulators)
without accounting for other factors, such as population or the amount of
the gross domestic product based on financial services:
H1: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
H2: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 after
controlling for year fixed effects.
The next hypothesis attempts to account for the fact that significant
differences in population size amongst the states may influence the
amount an individual state will spend to regulate financial services:
H3: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 after
taking into account differences in population.
The last hypothesis undertakes the same analysis as H6 but excludes
states that are outliers because they are the only state within a particular
regulatory option, such as Michigan in Option 6, or because they are
unusually large:
H7: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 4, and 5 after
excluding the possible outlying states of California, Michigan, and
New Jersey and taking into account differences in gross state
domestic product and controlling for year fixed effects.138
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Sample Selection
We have collected data on how much each state and the District of
& ECON. GROWTH, 2002 ANN. REP. 11 (2002) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2002 ANN. REP.].
137. MICH. FIN. INST. BUREAU, 1999 ANN. REP, supra note 71, at 55; MICH. INS. BUREAU, 1999
ANN. REP., supra note 71, at 25; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES 2003 ANN. REP., supra note 71, at
11.
138. California was also excluded because it is significantly larger than any other state, which
makes it is an outlier in terms of financial spending. For Option 3 (consolidated agency for banking and
insurance), we only have complete data for New Jersey and for Option 6 (single agency organized to
regulate for risk not sector), we only have data for Michigan.
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Columbia spent to regulate financial services from 1990 to 2006. 139 For
purposes of this article, only the data from 2001 to 2004 was used. We
only used this data because the Michigan OFIS was not created until April
2000. As a result, we only have a full year’s worth of data for Option 6
(single agency organized to regulate based on risk rather than sector)
beginning in 2001.
We decided to look at the data over this period of time because it could
enable one to eliminate or account for isolated fluctuations in a state’s
budget in a particular year. It also allows one to gather anecdotal evidence
of how much each state’s costs have changed if it consolidated regulatory
agencies or created new ones during this period. Finally, it also allows
one to see to what extent states’ spending changed to accommodate
changes in federal regulation.
Because of the transparency issues mentioned above, we encountered
difficulties in gathering complete budgetary data for all 50 states. We had
complete data on the states’ budgets for a total of 150 observations for the
years 2001 to 2004. If we had complete data for all of the states for 2001
to 2004, we would have a total of 204 observations. Since we did not have
complete data for all of the states for 2001 to 2004, we can only reach
preliminary conclusions based on the data available. In addition, we only
had one state, Michigan, which used the regulatory structure of Option 6
(single regulator organized to regulate for risk not sectors) between 2001
and 2004, and we only had complete data on one state, New Jersey, for
Option 3 (consolidated agency for banking and insurance) for the period
from 2001 to 2004. It is difficult to be certain that any results finding cost
savings from using Options 3 and 6 are reliable given the extremely
limited number of observations available to us for those categories.
To provide an example of what the compiled data looks like, we have
supplied the data for the year 2002 in the table in Appendix A. This table
provides the available data for the total amount that each state spent on
financial services regulation in 2002. In order to give some sense as to
how much each state spends to regulate financial services given the size
of the banking, securities, and insurance sectors contributions to the
state’s GDP, the ratio of regulatory costs per million dollars of GDP
produced in the financial services as defined by North American Industry

139. In addition, to gathering budgetary data, we collected data regarding the workloads of the state
regulators, e.g., how many entities do they regulate, how many charters or licenses did they issue, how
many enforcement actions did they bring, and how many consumer complaints did they receive. We hope
to use this data to measure the budgets of the states in relation to the outputs of states to determine if some
states have lower budgets given the size of the financial services industry within the state because the
states are simply not doing much to regulate the industry or enforce the laws regulating the industry. This
data is still incomplete, and we are still assessing the best way to measure these outputs.
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Classification system is provided.140 In addition, the regulatory costs per
person living within the state are provided as another benchmark for
gauging how much each state spends to regulate financial services.
As the table in Appendix A indicates, states show a wide variation on
how much they spend to regulate financial services within their
boundaries. As a share of GDP from financial services, South Dakota
spent the least to regulate financial services by spending only $599 per
million dollars of GDP from financial services and Alaska spent the most
by spending $7,062 per million of GDP from financial services. On a per
capita basis, Indiana spent the least, $1.99 per person, and the District of
Columbia spent the most, $19.64. On average, in 2002, the states spent
$2,617 per million dollars of GDP generated by the financial services
industry within the state or $5.42 per person residing in the state to
regulate financial services. Not surprisingly, given the lack of federal
regulation for insurance, states spend on average almost two-thirds of
their budgets for financial services regulation on insurance regulation.
Table 3 provides a comparison of the average regulatory costs of states
that use each of the six regulatory options described in the table in
Appendix A.

140. The North American Industry Classification system was adopted following the signing and
ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement in order to harmonize the industrial
classification systems of the United States, Canada and Mexico. North American Industry Classification
System, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#q1
(last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
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Table 3: Average Costs for States that Use the Six Different Regulatory
Options for 2002141

Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Option 6

Regulatory Costs per Million
Dollars of State GDP for
Finance & Insurance Sector
(in constant 2000 dollars)

Regulatory Costs
per Million of
Population (in
constant 2000
dollars)

$2,470.81
$3,127.55
$1,137.62
$3,207.61
$2,915.94
$1,831.17

$4.93
$5.59
$3.99
$9.42
$5.81
$3.51

B. Regression Results
Throughout all of the models, cost is the dependent variable. The cost
for different years has been converted into 2004 dollars using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics inflation calculator. In the first regression the model
that is tested is:
Costit =  + optionit + it
Where:
Costit is the cost to state i in year t.

141. This data is still preliminary for several reasons. First, some states have embedded the division
or department that regulates securities in another agency and that agency does not usually provide
breakdowns of its budget for each division or department. As a result, the direct costs of financial
regulation of securities could not be included and the total direct costs of financial regulation in those
states are understated. Second, not all states use the same fiscal year for budgeting purposes and so the
time frames for comparison purposes may be off by three to six months. In addition, one state, Oregon,
only uses biennium budgets, not annual budgets. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 35; CAL. DEP’T. FIN.
INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 24-25; GA DEP’T. OF BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP., supra note
19; HAW. COMPLIANCE RES. FUND REP., supra note 19; IND. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note
19, at 16; IOWA ANN. REP. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, supra note 19, at 27; MISS. DEP’T.
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 12-14; 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ANN. REP.,
supra note 19, at 1 (2002); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST. ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 19; VT
ANN. REP. INS. COMM’R, supra note 19, at 10; WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2;
W.VA. ANN. REP. FIN. INST., supra note 19, at 14, 18, 23; State of Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation website, supra note 19; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REPORT 2003,
supra note 71.
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Optionit is a vector of variables which indicates under which regulatory
option state i is operating in year t. The option is a categorical variable.
The options that are represented are:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Option 1: Separate Agency for banking, securities, and
insurance firms
Option 2: Banks and securities firms
Option 3: Banks and insurers
Option 4: Securities firms and insurers
Option 5: Single agency containing divisions for banking,
securities, and insurance
Option 6: Single supervisor for financial services

The results from testing H1 (Option 1 is more expensive than Options
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) are as follows:
Variable
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Option 6

Coefficient
- 1.36 E 07
2.84 E 07
- 1.62 E07
-2.61 E 07
4.30 E 06

P-Value
0.07
0.15
0.36
<0.01
0.83

As noted above, this regression, and all that follow, employs the use of a
categorical variable for the different regulatory options. The base case is
Option 1, which was described previously in the article. A negative
(positive) coefficient indicates that the option is cheaper (more expensive)
than the base case. The results indicate that only Option 5 (combined
regulator) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and appear to be
associated with lower costs than Option 1 (multiple regulators). The other
options show no statistically significant difference. The adjusted R-square
for this regression was approximately 0.05.
The second model that is tested is:
Costit =  + optionit + yeart +it
Where the cost and option variables are the same as above.
Year is a vector of variables indicating the year in order to control for
intertemporal changes common to all states in the sample.
The results from testing H2 (Option 1 is more expensive than Options
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 after taking into account the year fixed effects) are as
follows:
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Variable
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Option 6
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004

Coefficient
- 1.40 E 07
2.93 E 07
- 1.64 E07
-2.67 E 07
3.82 E 06
-287,504.1
-1.31 E 06
-148,704.2
5.47 E 06

931

P-Value
0.072
0.143
0.360
0.005
0.849
0.978
0.897
0.988
0.606

The results again indicate that Option 5 (combined regulator) appears to
be associated with lower costs than Option 1 (multiple regulators). The
other options show no statistically significant difference. The adjusted Rsquare for this regression was approximately 0.0291.
The next model controlled for differences in the population size of the
states. The model tested was:
Costit =  + optionit + popit +it
Where the cost and option variables are the same as above.
Pop is the estimated population in state i in year t.
The results from testing H3 (Option 1 is more expensive than Options
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 after taking into account differences in population) are as
follows:
Variable
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Option 6
Estimated population

Coefficient
4.44 E 06
2.17 E 07
- 8.50 E 06
5.41 E 06
-1.05 E 07
5.25

P-Value
0.101
0.002
0.168
0.109
0.127
<.001

The results this time indicate that Option 3, which is statistically
significant at the .01 level, (banking and insurance combined), appears to
be associated with higher costs than Option 1 (multiple regulators). The
other options show no statistically significant difference. The estimated
population variable is statistically significant at the .01 level. The adjusted
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R-square for this regression was approximately 0.88.142
When controlling for the estimated population of the state, we find that
only Option 3 is statistically significantly different from Option 1. Option
5 is not statistically significant when the population of the state is
controlled for. We also do not detect a difference among the other options.
However, it is important to note that while Option 3 is statistically
significant the difference is actually quite small. When controlling for
population on average, Option 3 is approximately $21 million more
expensive than Option 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY
A. Conclusions
Our results indicate that for most of the consolidated regulatory
options, there does not appear to be a statistically significant association
between lower costs and consolidated regulatory regimes. In fact, our
results find that Option 3, in which banking and insurance regulation is
consolidated into a single agency, is associated with higher costs than
using Option 1 or multiple regulators.
It is unclear at this time why Option 3 appears to be more expensive
than Option 1. It may be due to the fact that, as previously mentioned, the
Option 1 numbers may understate how much some of the states are
spending for financial services because of the difficulty of obtaining data
on spending for securities regulation for some Option 1 states, particularly
New York.143 Figure 8 below shows the variation among the states for
which complete data was available.

142. Please note: the population of the state was highly correlated with the size of the financial
services industry variable. Therefore, due to concerns about multicollinearity both variables could not be
included in the regression. Further, the population of the state is more likely to be exogenous than the size
of the financial services industry which could have issues of endogeneity. It should be noted, however
that the results were similar when the size of the financial services industry variable was used instead of
the population variable.
143. New York regulates securities through its Office of the Attorney General and the Office of the
Secretary of State. Neither of the publicly available budgets for these offices provide a breakdown of how
much they spend to regulate securities. Although we submitted Freedom of Information Act requests with
these agencies, they have declined to provide us with this data on the grounds that they do not publish the
accounts for the divisions within the Attorney General’s office.
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Figure 8: Regulatory costs per million dollars of GDP from financial
services for the states with complete data that used one of the six
different regulatory options for 2002144
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It would be worthwhile to investigate what exactly is driving Option 3
states to spend more than Option 1 states.
Does the failure to find that consolidation leads to cost savings mean
that the United States would not benefit from moving to a single financial
regulator? Not necessarily. Costs are only half of the analysis when doing
cost-benefit analysis. One still needs to assess the benefits and weigh
them against the costs before concluding that it would not be in the
interests of the United States to change its regulatory structure. Given that
most of the consolidator regulatory regimes used at the state level do not
appear to be associated with higher costs, moving to single financial
services regulator would likely not be precluded on the grounds that it
would result in higher operating costs on an annual basis than the current
multiple regulator model now used. Moving from one regime to another
would entail some initial, one-time expenses. We have not attempted to
estimate those expenses in this article, although it may be worth
investigating if policymakers are persuaded that a single financial
services regulator offers sufficient benefits in other areas, such as
consumer protection, to warrant changing models.
Other articles have outlined from a theoretical perspective the
advantages and disadvantages that the United States would face if it
144. See infra Appendix A.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

43

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 1

934

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

decided to move to a single financial services agency. 145 These studies
discuss some of the substantial advantages that a single financial services
regulator offers over the current U.S. regulatory regime, which include,
among others:
• A single regulator would be better than the current regime because
it would be able to monitor risks across firms and sectors and
address such risks strategically.
• A single regulator would be able to regulate financial
conglomerates more effectively.
• A single regulator would be able to respond more effectively to the
globalization of the financial markets.
• A single regulator would be less prone to capture.
• A single regulator would provide improved consumer
protections.146
A complete cost-benefit analysis also needs to assess the following
costs to society:147
• A single regulator would reduce regulatory competition and
experimentation to the extent that both are present in the current
system.
• A single regulator may have difficulty prioritizing issues.
• A single regulator may have difficulty responding to smaller firms
and, thus, may undermine the diversity of institutions that
currently comprise the financial industry within the state.
• A single regulator may lose or fail to develop staff with specialized
knowledge related to large and small companies and industry
sectors.
• A single regulator may lack transparency when making rules.
• A single regulator may lack accountability to both consumers and
market participants.
• A single regulator may experience significant logistical problems
when it merges the existing regulators in order to be created.
It may be impossible to accurately assess some of these costs in advance.
In addition, when considering these costs, policymakers should also
review the ways that some of the costs could either be eliminated or

145. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4.
146. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4; Brown, Consolidated Financial Regulation, supra note 2.
147. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra. note 6, at 130-31; Martinez & Rose, supra note
2 at 27-31.
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reduced, which have been outlined in some of the studies done to date on
single financial regulators.
B. Future Lines of Inquiry
As we have indicated, our results are preliminary because we have not
been able to obtain complete budgetary data for all 50 states. We will only
have a full picture of how much it costs the state governments to regulator
financial services after we obtain all of the budgetary data on how states
regulate securities.
Based on the preliminary data from the states, it appears that the
question of whether states should adopt a single financial regulator model
or maintain separate regulators for the different financial sectors will not
turn solely on the direct costs that may be paid by the state governments.
If the results are the same after obtaining complete budgetary data for the
states, it would indicate that consolidation by itself does not guarantee any
cost savings. Other factors, such as regulatory intensity of a state and the
regulatory economies of scale, need to be accounted for when determining
whether consolidation will achieve any cost savings.
It might, therefore, be useful to attempt to control for some factors that
we did not control for in this study. For example, it might be useful to
discern what role economies of scale play in the costs to state
governments of regulating financial services. Larger states may take
advantage of economies of scale, which may exceed the cost savings one
might expect to achieve from consolidated regulation. Five of the Option
5 states—Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, and Vermont—have relatively
small populations and relatively small GDPs from financial services. If
one examines Figure 9, one can see that the spending by these states may
mask the benefits of consolidated regulation because of their inability to
take advantage of economies of scale available to larger states.
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Figure 9: Regulatory costs per million dollars of GDP from financial
services for all of the states that used one of the six different regulatory
options for 2002148

It would also be useful to determine to what extent cost savings may
be possible from eliminating the regulatory overlap and duplication
between state and federal regulators for banking and securities and among
state regulators for insurance. One might not be getting an accurate
picture of what the cost savings would be for the United States if it
consolidated all of its regulators into a single agency by looking at the
effect of agency consolidation at the state level. Much of the overlap and
duplication of financial services regulation in the United States is not
between state banking, insurance, and securities agencies, but between
state agencies and federal agencies or among state regulators. Thus, one
avenue for future research would be to attempt to determine what the cost
savings would be if duplicative federal and state regulatory efforts are
eliminated.
Another avenue for further investigation is how much financial
services firms would save in terms of their spending to comply with
federal and state regulations if all duplicative and overlapping regulations
were eliminated. This article has looked only at the amounts spent by state
governments to operate their regulatory agencies. Simply looking at the
amount that the government spends to regulate financial services
underestimates the total costs to the various state regulatory regimes
within the United States because it does not capture how much more
148. See infra Appendix A.
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companies and individuals must pay to operate within each state. The
regulatory costs are a fraction of the fees, assessments, and taxes that the
state and federal governments charge financial services firms. For
example, in 2002, state insurance department budgets totaled $946.6
million but the total revenues generated from fees, assessments, fines,
penalties, and taxes assessed by states on insurance companies totaled
$12.52 billion.149 The state insurance department budgets represented
only 7.56 percent of the total revenues generated. In order to assess the
total costs for the current regulatory regime, the amount spent by firms
and individuals to comply with the regulatory requirements of the system
must also be taken into account.
In the United States, insurance companies must become licensed in
each state in which they want to offer insurance and must get
authorization from these states for the products that it offers. If a new
company wants to offer insurance in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia, it must first apply for a license to operate from each one of
these 51 jurisdictions, then it must seek advanced approval from each of
these 51 jurisdictions for each of its products that it will offer, and finally
it must obtain a license for each producer or agent in each state who will
sell its products.150 The costs involved in completing the applications for
all of these licenses as well as paying the relevant fees are significant,
creating a barrier to entry, particularly for small firms. Efforts by NAIC
to encourage uniformity and coordination among states have not been
extremely successful.
In 2002, the total number of domestic insurers (insurers domiciled in
the state in which the business is written) in the 50 states and the District
of Columbia equaled 7,090, or an average of 139 domestic insurers per
state.151 The number of foreign insurers (insurers domiciled in a state
different from the state in which the business is written) is larger than the
number of domestic insurers in every state. On average, 1,357 foreign
insurers operate in each state, which means that, on average, foreign
insurers comprise a little over 90 percent of the total number of insurers
in a state.152
If one assumes that states generally charge the same taxes, fees,
assessments, fines, and penalties to foreign insurers as to domestic
insurers, than states raised $10.88 billion of the $12.52 billion in total
revenue that states earned from taxes, fees, assessments, fines, penalties,
and other sources from foreign insurers.153 Most of this $10.88 billion
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

NAIC 2002 REPORT, supra note 112, at 22 and 25.
BAIR REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12.
NAIC 2002 REPORT, supra note 112, at 30 and 39.
Id.
Id. at 25 and 39.
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could be saved if insurers only had to pay fees and assessments to the state
in which they were domiciled. These added costs create barriers to entry
and reduce competition in the insurance sector.154
Compliance costs for other financial services providers are equally
daunting. According to banking industry estimates, banking institutions,
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, spent approximately $25 billion annually
to comply with federal and state regulations.155 In the wake of the DoddFrank Act and its accompanying regulations, compliance costs for the
financial services have gone up.156 Financial services firms will attempt
to pass along to their business and consumer clients the costs that they
incur to comply with the existing regulatory regime in the United States.
Thus, consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole pay a large price for
the current regulatory structure.
These numbers are crude estimates of the compliance costs to financial
services firms under the current system. All of these costs would not be
eliminated if the United States moved to a single financial services
regulator. A closer examination of compliance costs by financial services
firms is needed to determine how much they would save or would not be
passed along to consumers if duplicative and overlapping regulations
were eliminated.
The other avenues of inquiry listed above would help provide a fuller
picture of what the costs are of the current system and what costs may
arise if the United State were to move to a single financial services
regulator. Our preliminary results, however, suggest that costs of
regulation are unlikely to be the determining factor in whether the United
States should convert its regulatory regime from its current model to a
single regulator. Instead, the value added by a single regulator model in
other areas, such as consumer protection, probably holds the key as to

154. For example, about 66 percent of the respondents to a recent survey of life insurance providers
considered the current state regulatory structure for insurance to impose barriers to entry, particularly for
small firms. BAIR REPORT, supra. note 6, at 31 and 51-52. Out of 383 companies in the life insurance
business that were sent the survey, 129 companies responded.
155. Opening Statement of Chairman Spencer Bachus, Hearing of Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit Subcommittee on the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act, H.R. 1375, 1 (Mar. 27,
2003).
156. See OCC, Mem. Economic Impact Analysis for Swaps Margin Final Rule (Oct. 16, 2015)
(Estimates rule would result in compliance costs of between $2.8 billion and $5.2 billion); SEC, Pay Ratio
Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50104, 50161 (Oc. 18, 2015)(Estimates total compliance costs for affected
registrants would be approximately $1.3 billion); CFPB, Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80
Fed. Reg. 66128, 66295 (Oct. 28, 2015)(Estimates rule will result in compliance costs of up to $1.2 billion
for repository institutions with less than $10 billion in assets); CFTC, Margin Requirements for Uncleared
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 636, 692 (Jan. 6, 2016) (Estimates
rule would result in compliances costs of up to $2.05 billion). But see, Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, How
Much
Did
Dodd-Frank Cost? Don’t
Ask
Banks,
BNA.com,
Feb.
2, 2017,
https://www.bna.com/doddfrank-cost-dont-n57982083211/ (Discusses the difficulties in estimating how
much compliance costs have gone up for banks).
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whether the United States would benefit from switching regulatory
regimes.
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APPENDIX A
TOTAL STATE REGULATORY COSTS FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR 2002157
Regulatory
State GDP
for Financial
State

State

Services

Regulatory

(millions of

Category

constant
2000 dollars)
(NAIC)

Annual Total
Financial Services
Regulators
Appropriations (in
constant 2000
dollars )

Costs per

Total

Million

Regulatory

Dollars of

Costs (in

State GDP

constant

for Financial

2000

Services (in

dollars) per

constant

person

2000 dollars)
Alabama

1

Alaska

5

Arizona

1

$6,203

$22,330,377.14

$3,599.93

$4.99

$884

$6,243,613.72

$7,062.91

$9.75

$13,068

$12,911,389.82

$988.02

$2.37

Arkansas

1

$3,045

$16,059,340.64

$5,274.00

$5.93

California

1

$88,174

$199,699,344.99

$2,264.83

$5.70

Colorado

5

$11,444

$11,197,528.00

$978.46

$2.49

Connecticut

2

$24,272

$34,268,925.06

$1,411.87

$9.91

Delaware
District of
Columbia

1

$13,717

$8,416,645.53

$613.59

$10.45

4

$3,308

$11,368,848.32

$3,436.77

$19.64

Florida

5

$34,554

$70,920,443.29

$2,052.45

$4.25

Georgia

1

$16,989

$27,465,984.90

$1,616.69

$3.19

Hawaii

5

$1,975

$13,912,779.20

$7,044.45

$11.28

Idaho

2

$1,531

$9,202,696.86

$6,010.91

$6.85

Illinois

3

$44,072

$63,785,404.10

$1,447.30

$5.06

Indiana

1

$10,996

$12,253,001.96

$1,114.31

$1.99

Iowa

5

$8,863

$13,708,827.02

$1,546.75

$4.67

157. This data is still preliminary for several reasons. First, some states have embedded the division
or department that regulates securities in another agency and that agency does not usually provide
breakdowns of its budget for each division or department. As a result, the direct costs of financial
regulation of securities could not be included and the total direct costs of financial regulation in those
states are understated. Second, not all states use the same fiscal year for budgeting purposes and so the
time frames for comparison purposes may be off by three to six months. In addition, one state, Oregon,
only uses biennium budgets, not annual budgets. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 35; CAL. DEP’T. FIN.
INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 24-25; GA DEP’T. OF BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP., supra note
19; HAW. COMPLIANCE RES. FUND REP., supra note 19; IND. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note
19, at 16; IOWA ANN. REP. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, supra note 19, at 27; MISS. DEP’T.
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 12-14; 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ANN. REP.,
supra note 19, at 1 (2002); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST. ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 19; VT
ANN. REP. INS. COMM’R, supra note 19, at 10; WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2;
W.V. ANN. REP. FIN. INST., supra note 19, at 14, 18, 23; State of Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation website, supra note 19; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REPORT 2003,
supra note 71; NAIC 2002 REPORT, supra note 112.
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Regulatory
State GDP
for Financial
State

State

Services

Regulatory

(millions of

Category

constant
2000 dollars)
(NAIC)

Annual Total
Financial Services
Regulators
Appropriations (in
constant 2000
dollars )

Costs per

Total

Million

Regulatory

Dollars of

Costs (in

State GDP

constant

for Financial

2000

Services (in

dollars) per

constant

person

2000 dollars)
Kansas

1

$5,225

$16,197,316.00

$3,099.96

$5.97

Kentucky

2

$5,551

$32,012,256.13

$5,766.93

$7.83

Louisiana

2

$5,265

$26,956,899.89

$5,120.02

$6.03

Maine

5

$2,565

$8,477,778.92

$3,305.18

$6.54

Maryland

1

$12,978

$26,815,809.80

$2,066.25

$4.93

Massachusetts

3

$29,781

$19,356,364.58

$649.96

$3.01

Michigan

6

$19,244

$35,239,024.58

$1,831.17

$3.51

Minnesota

5

$18,105

$13,007,782.57

$718.46

$2.59

Mississippi

1

$2,857

$10,159,872.28

$3,556.13

$3.55

Missouri

1

$10,574

$18,989,886.82

$1,795.90

$3.34

Montana

4

$1,113

$4,904,180.16

$4,406.27

$5.39

Nebraska

2

$4,710

$11,831,512.08

$2,512.00

$6.85

Nevada
New
Hampshire

3

$6,095

$6,778,683.80

$1,112.17

$3.12

1

$3,830

$8,147,964.73

$2,127.41

$6.40

New Jersey

3

$30,475

$40,868,542.89

$1,341.05

$4.76

New Mexico

2

$1,900

$5,329,932.43

$2,805.23

$2.87

New York
North
Carolina

1

$126,541

$167,385,284.21

$1,322.78

$8.73

1

$27,755

$36,651,877.18

$1,320.55

$4.41

North Dakota

1

$1,227

$5,760,504.20

$4,694.79

$9.09

Ohio

2

$26,519

$41,557,524.72

$1,567.08

$3.64

Oklahoma

1

$4,581

$15,043,242.95

$3,283.83

$4.31

Oregon

5

$6,204

$16,420,736.64

$2,646.80

$4.66

Pennsylvania

1

$29,886

$38,518,620.81

$1,288.85

$3.13

Rhode Island
South
Carolina

5

$4,509

$5,550,010.53

$1,230.87

$5.19

1

$5,423

$9,003,478.98

$1,660.24

$2.20

South Dakota

5

$4,421

$2,649,733.84

$599.35

$3.49

Tennessee

4

$10,528

$18,737,637.28

$1,779.79

$3.24

Texas

1

$45,534

$72,200,359.22

$1,585.64

$3.32

Utah

1

$6,144

$10,120,274.90

$1,647.18

$4.35

Vermont

5

$1,072

$6,487,875.44

$6,052.12

$10.53
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Regulatory
State GDP
for Financial
State

State

Services

Regulatory

(millions of

Category

constant
2000 dollars)
(NAIC)

Annual Total
Financial Services
Regulators
Appropriations (in
constant 2000
dollars )

Costs per

Total

Million

Regulatory

Dollars of

Costs (in

State GDP

constant

for Financial

2000

Services (in

dollars) per

constant

person

2000 dollars)
Virginia

5

$17,949

$31,473,173.48

$1,753.48

$4.32

Washington

2

$12,533

$20,442,986.73

$1,631.13

$3.37

West Virginia

1

$1,748

$8,034,798.03

$4,596.57

$4.45

Wisconsin

2

$12,228

$16,174,547.12

$1,322.75

$2.97

Wyoming

1

$594

$2,875,164.59

$4,840.34

$5.76

$788,759.00

$1,343,906,789.07

Total
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APPENDIX B
TOTAL STATE BANKING AND INSURANCE REGULATORY COSTS FOR
2002158

State

Annual Total

Total Banking and

Banking &

Insurance Regulatory

State

Insurance

Appropriations per

Insurance

Regulatory

Regulatory

Million Dollars of

Regulatory Costs

Category

Appropriations (in

Fin. & Ins. State GDP

(in constant 2000

constant 2000

(in constant 2000

dollars) per person

dollars)

dollars)

Total Banking &

Alabama

1

$19,881,129.46

$3,205.08

$4.44

Alaska

5

$6,243,613.72

$7,062.91

$9.75

Arizona

1

$8,531,892.22

$652.88

$1.57

Arkansas

1

$14,247,598.58

$4,679.01

$5.26

California

1

$175,310,886.96

$1,988.24

$5.01

Colorado

5

$11,197,528.00

$978.46

$2.49

Connecticut

2

$34,268,925.06

$1,411.87

$9.91

Delaware
District of
Columbia

1

$7,824,331.16

$570.41

$9.71

4

$11,368,848.32

$3,436.77

$19.64

Florida

5

$70,920,443.29

$2,052.45

$4.25

Georgia

1

$27,465,984.90

$1,616.69

$3.19

Hawaii

5

$9,546,830.74

$4,833.84

$7.74

Idaho

2

$9,202,696.86

$6,010.91

$6.85

Illinois

3

$63,785,404.10

$1,447.30

$5.06

Indiana

1

$11,412,939.75

$1,037.92

$1.85

Iowa

5

$12,786,100.20

$1,442.64

$4.36

Kansas

1

$13,433,368.29

$2,570.98

$4.95

Kentucky

2

$29,747,524.72

$5,358.95

$7.28

Louisiana

2

$26,956,899.89

$5,120.02

$6.03

Maine

5

$8,477,778.92

$3,305.18

$6.54

Maryland

1

$24,827,499.10

$1,913.05

$4.56

158. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 35; CAL. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2425; GA DEP’T. OF BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP., supra note 19; HAW. COMPLIANCE RES. FUND
REP., supra note 19; IND. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 16; IOWA ANN. REP. OF
SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, supra note 19, at 27; MISS. DEP’T. BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN.
REP., supra note 19, at 12-14; 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 1 (2002); S.C.
BOARD OF FIN. INST. ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 19; VT ANN. REP. INS. COMM’R, supra
note 19, at 10; WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2; W.V. ANN. REP. FIN. INST., supra
note 19, at 14, 18, 23; State of Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation website, supra
note 19; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REPORT 2003, supra note 71; NAIC 2002 REPORT,
supra note 112.
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Banking &

Insurance Regulatory

State

Insurance

Appropriations per

Total Banking &
Insurance

Regulatory

Regulatory

Million Dollars of

Regulatory Costs

Category

Appropriations (in

Fin. & Ins. State GDP

(in constant 2000

constant 2000

(in constant 2000

dollars) per person

dollars)

dollars)

Massachusetts

3

$19,356,364.58

$649.96

$3.01

$1,831.17

$3.51

Michigan

6

$35,239,024.58

Minnesota

5

$13,007,782.57

$718.46

$2.59

Mississippi

1

$10,159,872.28

$3,556.13

$3.55

Missouri

1

$18,206,724.32

$1,721.84

$3.21

Montana

4

$4,406,224.49

$3,958.87

$4.84

Nebraska

2

$11,831,512.08

$2,512.00

$6.85

Nevada
New
Hampshire

3

$6,778,683.80

$1,112.17

$3.12

1

$7,472,263.06

$1,950.98

$5.87

New Jersey

3

$33,080,776.70

$1,085.51

$3.86

New Mexico

2

$5,329,932.43

$2,805.23

$2.87

New York
North
Carolina

1

$167,385,284.21

$1,322.78

$8.73

1

$33,707,442.05

$1,214.46

$4.05

North Dakota

1

$4,733,236.97

$3,857.57

$7.47

Ohio

2

$41,557,524.72

$1,567.08

$3.64

Oklahoma

1

$12,054,869.54

$2,631.49

$3.46

Oregon

5

$16,420,736.64

$2,646.80

$4.66

Pennsylvania

1

$32,000,099.71

$1,070.74

$2.60

Rhode Island
South
Carolina

5

$5,550,010.53

$1,230.87

$5.19

1

$9,003,478.98

$1,660.24

$2.20

South Dakota

5

$2,649,733.84

$599.35

$3.49

Tennessee

4

$17,578,182.86

$1,669.66

$3.04

Texas

1

$63,001,694.08

$1,383.62

$2.89

Utah

1

$9,018,400.75

$1,467.84

$3.88

Vermont

5

$6,487,875.44

$6,052.12

$10.53

Virginia

5

$31,473,173.48

$1,753.48

$4.32

Washington

2

$17,446,398.65

$1,392.04

$2.87

West Virginia

1

$8,034,798.03

$4,596.57

$4.45

Wisconsin

2

$16,174,547.12

$1,322.75

$2.97

Wyoming

1

$2,635,864.99

$4,437.48

$5.28

Total
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